ELECTION SECURITY

I. Legal Norms and Standards

II. Considerations

III. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

 

A. Election Security

Elections in which the voting population has been subject to threats or physical attacks are compromised and cannot reflect the will of the people. Electoral actors should expect formerly warring parties to resist moves that weaken their bargaining position. This will be particularly true if political power stemming from the elections is not expected to reflect the balance of military power following the end of the conflict. In this case, important actors may exit the process and use violence as a means of securing a more favorable outcome.

Election-related violence stems from a wide variety of sources: government forces and rebel militias may seek to intimidate voters in order to ensure that their positions on the battlefield are reflected in the distribution of mandates stemming form the election; external governments and non-governmental political actors with a stake in the conflict may seek to influence the outcome of the vote; and local populations and actors may seek to extract revenge on returning voters for perceived wrongs committed during the conflict. Elections conducted in these environments must account for the political dynamics at work, and ensure that provisional measures are in place to minimize the security threat that these dynamics present to the electorate.

Conflict-forced migrants are especially vulnerable to election related violence. These populations should be considered subject voters in that their ability to make free political choices is often compromised by an overwhelming dependence for survival upon the services of the government seeking to retain power or upon political/military force controlling the area where they reside.  While election-related violence is a threat to both displaced and non-displaced voters, special mechanisms for CFM participation should be designed so as to minimize threats to any voter’s physical safety.

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B. Considerations

Election security must address the exposure to physical threat that displaced persons must manage in their current location, while in transit, and in re-establishing themselves in their home communities. Refugees and IDP are particularly exposed in the five major stages of an electoral process:

• Identity conflict can occur during the registration process when refugees or other conflict-forced migrants cannot establish or re-establish their officially recognized identities;
• Campaign conflict can occur as rival seeks to disrupt the opponent’s campaign, intimidate voters and candidates, and use threats and violence to influence participation in the voting;
• Balloting conflict can occur on Election Day when political rivalries are played out at the polling station;
• Results conflict can occur in disputes over elections results and the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve these disputes in a timely, fair, and transparent manner;
• Representation conflict can occur when elections are organized as “zero sum” events where “losers” are left out of participation and governance. ( For more information on issues of election violence, see Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Stratagy for Study and Prevention.”)

B.1. Determining Whether to Proceed:

Elections are increasingly seen as a key component of a peace-building process and the political imperative to proceed can be very strong, even if conditions may not yet be ripe. The 1992 elections in Angola, for example, achieved none of international community’s peace-building objectives, primarily because the actors were not yet prepared to move from the battlefield to the ballot box. In the 1997 Liberian elections, security fears kept many eligible CFM voters from participating and the elections did not lead to the consolidation of peace. In these situations, the decision to proceed with elections can potentially result in further human suffering.

In some cases, however, elections have proceeded in the face of an apparently unsuitable security environment and nevertheless played an important role in the peace process. Despite calls for a postponement or cancellation of elections in Cambodia, East Timor, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) due to security fears, these electoral events indeed contributed to reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.

Negotiators and election officials must make difficult decisions regarding election timing in conditions of high uncertainty and each case will vary based on the unique dynamics of the conflict. It is not possible to provide a clear guidance applicable to all situations. Nevertheless, those charged with determining whether to proceed should pay special attention to the unique security issues confronting refugees and IDPs as part of the decision-making calculus.

B.2. Roll of Security Forces

Voter security requires effective cooperation between election authorities and security forces. In post-conflict elections, however, it cannot be assumed that local security forces are impartial, and the presence of local police or military units could intimidate voters or undermine the transparency of the vote. In the 1999 East Timor Referendum, the Indonesian government formally committed to providing security during the voting process, yet many observers and UN officials pointed out that elements of the Indonesian military were providing support to the militia groups opposed to independence, and that these groups were actively terrorizing the population to influence the outcome of the ballot. In BiH, all three parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement had committed to protect minority rights and allow for minority returns for the purposes of voting. Yet observers concluded that in many areas local security and police forces either did nothing to prevent (and even actively participated in) actions threatening the security of minority groups that sought to return to their home municipalities in order to vote. In Liberia, the Economic Community of Western African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops managed to maintain an overall sense of calm and security for the elections, but troop density was insufficient, and many areas of the country remained off-limits to returning voters.

The issue is even more complicated in elections without international peace-keeping forces. In Russia/Chechnya, for example, the absence of a neutral security guarantor prevented many ethnic Chechens from returning home to vote. Similarly, in the 1996 Palestinian elections, many potential voters were dissuaded from participating in the Israeli-controlled areas of East Jerusalem and in Hebron by the intense presence of Israeli Defense Forces.

Providing for the security of conflict-forced migrants is especially challenging. For IDPs, security depends on the relationship between electoral authorities and security forces in country, as well as the mechanisms designed to ensure transparent processes. For refugees, security depends on cooperative relationships with host country governments and/or protection in transit if the vote is conducted as part of the repatriation program. The following discussion highlights the major security challenges facing conflict-forced migrants and examines best and worst practices that emerged during the 1990s.

B.3. System Design

The choice of electoral systems and registration and voting procedures can also contribute to a peaceful ballot. At a general level, election rules need to ensure that all actors believe they have a fair chance of contesting the election, and that their interests are not repeatedly discriminated against.  Transparent and fair rules can help convince all sides that the process is working, making it more difficult for spoilers to claim that the election is biased against their interests. Key procedures here include:

• A neutral authority to provide transparent judicial overview of the process;
• A balanced composition of the election commission to ensure that all groups are represented;
• An effective and workable elections appeals and complaints procedure;
• Transparent election processes, including the ability for interested political parties and grass-roots organizations to monitor all phases of the elections process, including registration, claims & challenges, voting, and counting;
• Reasonable timeframes to accomplish the movement of ballots and counting procedures, combined with effective public information campaigns explaining why results may not be available for several days after the balloting.

Additional issues surrounding the relationship between refugees/IDPs and electoral system design can be found at the “Electoral Systems and the Displaced” part of this module.

B.4. Providing Election Security to IDPs

IDP voting raises significant security issues that might not apply to regular voters. First, and most importantly, procedures must be in place for universal absentee registration and balloting. Requiring displaced populations to return to their home communities to vote places them in direct contact with groups that may have been responsible for their displacement. The absence of a large scale, spontaneous return prior to the elections indicates that the security situation does not warrant the use of repatriation prior to elections as a means for IDP enfranchisement. In these situations, the only option for protecting IDPs’ physical safety is through registration and balloting in their place of current residence.

Second, because of their collective experience, IDP communities tend to function as close-knit sub-groups. As a result, they should be served by dedicated registration and polling centers near their location and staffed by fellow IDPs who understand their unique needs. Mixing displaced voters in with regular voters is certainly possible. However, co-mingling voters with varying identification and balloting needs can create long queues and overcrowded polling stations. In the 1997 Bosnian municipal elections, for example, the typical absentee station had to ensure that the voter received the proper ballot for one of 139 different municipalities, some of which had been reconstituted as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement and others of which were not even conducting elections. As a consequence, absentee polling stations generated enormous lines of frustrated and angry voters. The separation of these voters from regular voters can speed up the voting process and ensure that long lines and crowded facilities do not result in violence. This separation can occur either through separate lines and voting station within a “twin” station, or through providing special absentee balloting stations.

In addition, IDP populations often interpret voter registration and voting as a reaffirmation of their citizenship  or their right to return home. Thus, denial of registration can be interpreted as a broader denial of the individual’s right to membership in the polity conducting elections or of their right of return. If large numbers of IDPs are denied registration, crowded facilities may suddenly become flashpoints for demonstrations of anger at electoral authorities. Clear procedures should be in place to ensure that those denied registration: a) understand that this denial has no bearing on their right of return; and b) are provided the opportunity to appeal the decision through a formal judicial or administrative process. If the IDP is denied at the polling station, a universal conditional ballot should be implemented to afford the displaced voter a non-conflictive opportunity to participate. 

Procedures will need to be in place to protect election-related movements of people. These procedures should include the creation of safe transit routes, protected by neutral security forces, as well as organized movement programs such as those conducted by the UNHCR and NATO in the 1996 Bosnian elections, where recommended inter-entity voter routes were secured by additional security assets. In addition, procedures to ensure that neutral monitors have access to election facilities and registration/polling stations can reassure IDPs seeking to return to their home localities to participate. The presence of international peacekeepers and observes can also help ease tensions and create conditions favorable to the personal security of the returning voter. Here again, however, election administrators need to find the proper balance between providing effective security without sending signals that military forces should have unrestricted access to polling stations. In the BiH elections, the effective working relationship between the OSCE Election Department and the NATO Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) hierarchy through the Joint Elections Operations Commission provides a good example of ensuring that the military presence is not intrusive with effective coordination and cooperation to ensure that a response is possible should conditions deteriorate in a registration or polling station. Again, this cooperation is easier to accomplish in the midst of a massive international multi-mandate peace-keeping operation.

B.5. Providing Election Security to Refugees

Host governments are primarily responsible for the security of refugee voters within their borders. As a result, election administrators need to establish strong communication channels and cooperative relationships with the host states. As foreign relations are beyond the competence of election commissions, administrators will need to work with their government’s diplomatic branches as a first step to reaching out to host state governments. This entails briefing foreign ministry staff on elections procedures and requirements, as well as ensuring that procedures are in place for rapid communication of election issues between governments.

Because of the regional nature of refugee voting programs, inter-governmental organizations may need to be engaged.  IOM has been engaged in the conduct of refugee registration and voting for Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  An important tool in this regard is the negotiation of detailed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with host state governments and the assignment of dedicated officials in the host state to working on the elections process. These memoranda included detailed descriptions of the respective rights and obligations of each actor.

MoUs should include specific security provisions for registration and voting facilities. Provisions should include host-state commitments regarding support from local police and security forces, as well as mechanisms to ensure dialog and cooperation between the election administrators and the host state security services.

In cases where intense international supervision and support do not exist, less formal relationships can be established between the states conducting elections and the host states. For the Eritrean referendum, the relationships between the transitional regime in Ethiopia and Sudan  were generally amicable, owing largely to the cooperative arrangements the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had established with these governments.  Furthermore, Ethiopia and Sudan were anxious to see a formal end to the conflict that had precipitated refugee flows.  By finalizing Eritrea’s independence, Sudan and Ethiopia hoped to be relieved of their legal obligations under the 1951 Convention, and thereby, anticipated that the repatriation of the remaining refugee population would be expedited. Thus, Sudan made financial and logistical contributions in order to the elections process - both in refugee camps and in other locations where Eritreans resided.  Ethiopia contributed by providing security details. Outside of the region, the balloting was largely organized by the extremely cohesive and strong networks of expatriate civic organizations. Security in these registration and polling stations was largely managed by the local contacts these organizations enjoyed with the host state local and regional governments.

B.6. Other Security Issues Related to Refugee/IDP Voting

On a more general level, the participation of refugees and IDPs in elections can create wider security problems. First, if the displaced ballots are counted and reported separate from the regular ballots, it can quickly become obvious what the political preferences of these communities are. This information could potentially be used against the displaced populations and might create high levels of resentment against them in the area for which their ballots are cast. One solution to this problem would be to mix displaced ballots with regular ballots before the count. 

Second, the delays resulting from absentee voting programs could undermine the election process and create suspicions on the part of political actors that the election is not transparent. The political incentive to conduct and report results from an election can be enormous, and the extended timelines required to process and count absentee ballots can significantly slow down the reporting of results. The only solution here is to ensure that all political actors are aware that results might not be available immediately, and to ensure the full transparency of all components of absentee balloting, transport, and counting. It is probably not wise to report election results from the regular ballots prior to the count of absentee ballots, which would create expectations on the part of candidates and parties, which would be upset if the absentee ballots substantially change the outcome.

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C. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

·        Refugees and IDPs should always be provided the option of absentee balloting, particularly when conditions in the country organizing elections are not yet conducive for return as demonstrated by the absence of large-scale, country-wide spontaneous returns;

·         Dedicated absentee polling stations should be established for IDP voters, rather than having them vote in the same station as regular voters;

·         Election authorities need to establish safe transit routes and create procedures to ensure that displaced voters are able to return to their home polling station safely and securely. Election administrators should work closely with international security forces and with UNHCR, IOM and other international humanitarian organizations to provide safe means of transport;

·         Police forces should work closely with local elections officials to ensure a rapid response time in the event of a disturbance. Military forces should have their own dedicated registration and polling facilities. These rules should be clearly stated in the electoral code;

·        As a general rule, weapons of any kind should be off-limits in polling and registration stations except in emergency situations. In the event of a disturbance, only duly constituted and legally recognized police forces (not military) should be allowed entry and only until the disturbance is ended;

·        Voter registration should never be linked to property claims or the provision of social welfare benefits. In some cases, it is desirable to link the registration with a wider civil registration or national census, but perceptions that voter registration will in some way affect the displaced person’s welfare benefits or claims to specific property should be avoided;

·        In instances where the act of participating in elections would subject displaced voters to intimidation or retribution, ultra-violet stain should be employed rather than visible stain, when the staining method is used to prevent double voting;

·        Ballots for conflict-forced voters should be mixed with other votes during counting so that the voting preference of the displaced as a discrete group cannot be discerned;

·        Security for refugees is the responsibility of host state governments and is governed by their obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nevertheless, electoral actors need to work closely with host state governments and should negotiate detailed MoUs that include provisions for election security. Because of the regional nature of refugee problems, international organizations can be engaged to facilitate contact and cooperative relationships with refugee-hosting states.

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Election Security Legal Norms and Standards